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SOVEREIGNS, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING, AND
THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT AND SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM: THE THREE MODELS
SALAR GHAHRAMANI*
There are currently about 50,000 multinational enterprises
(“MNEs”), which, along with 450,000 affiliates, employ more than
200 million people around the world.1 The MNEs’ transborder
activities—their transfer of tangible or intangible assets and the
transport of equipment and physical property for the purposes of
plant building, manufacturing, and wealth creation for the MNEs
in general—are foreign direct investment (“FDI”) with significant
human and environmental consequences.
Not surprisingly, then, the conversations surrounding
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) in international investments
often involve framing the discussions from the FDI lens, usually in
three forms: (1) analyzing the existing instruments of international
soft law that aim to address the respective roles of the state and
MNEs in protecting and promoting human rights principles;2 (2)
considering the questions of universal jurisdiction and how
national courts can deal with transnational corporate misconduct
arising under either international customary law or torts and

* Assistant Professor of Business Law and International Law & Policy at the
Pennsylvania State University—Abington and the Founding Co-Chair of the
International Task Force on Sovereign Wealth Fund Research.
1 Multinational
Enterprises,
INT’L
LAB.
ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-promotion/multinationalenterprises/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
2 See, e.g., Special Representative of the Sec’y Gen. on the Issue of Human
Rights and Transnat’l Corps. and Other Bus. Enters, Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie)
(recommending that business enterprises conduct impact assessments and
incorporate relevant findings into business practices in order to “prevent and
mitigate adverse human rights impacts”).
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crimes;3 and (3) examining the intersection of investment treaties,
the host state’s regulatory environment, and the MNEs’ protections
and obligations under the various legal regimes.4
This Article aims to add another dimension to the discussion:
the consideration of the three models of sovereign-driven portfolio
investment (in contrast to foreign investment) and how
governments may pursue CSR and international law principles
through shareholder activism.
1.

PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM

Portfolio investment is contrasted with foreign investment in
that the former is normally represented by “a movement of money
for the purpose of buying shares in a company formed or
functioning in another country”5 as well as the purchase of other
security instruments—bonds, for instance—through which
companies can raise capital.6
Another distinguishing factor
between the two is the highly liquid nature of portfolio
investments: compared to FDI, where the investor’s assets
generally constitute physical infrastructure that may not easily be
bought and sold, a share or bond holder may utilize the capital
markets with relative ease in order to dispose of the security
instruments. As such, it may be argued that portfolio investors
have little to no commitments to the host countries, since shares
may be sold in a span of days—if not seconds.
Portfolio investors can be active or passive: they may or may
not attempt to pressure the companies in which they hold shares to
change their behavior. Activist shareholders use their power to
impact the processes or the outcomes of a particular company or to
do so at a larger scale and across several companies by
3 See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations
in Kiobel and Beyond, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1329 (2013) (advising courts to use
international law to supply the “conduct-regulating rule under the ATS,” the
Alien Torts Statute).
4
See, e.g., George K. Foster, Investors, States, and Stakeholders: Power
Asymmetries in International Investment and the Stabilizing Potential of Investment
Treaties, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 361 (2013) (describing how investment treaties
ought to be modified to enable local stakeholders to “protect their own human
rights” without reliance on their governments).
5 M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 7 (2d ed.
2004).
6 Id.
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symbolically targeting one or more firms.7 They can submit
proposals during shareholder meetings; write letters to fellow
shareholders, firm management, or to the media; or cast votes that
oppose the position of management in order to affect the firm’s
direction and trigger modifications in corporate governance.8
These actions are considered “voice activism.”9 Another type of
activism is “exit,” where disgruntled investors punish the firm by
selling their shares.10
The motivations behind activism are either financial—where
shareholders put pressure on management to issue dividends or to
enhance the company’s monetary results through slashing nonperforming units and decreasing executive pay—or social—where
shareholders are motivated by ethical, human rights, or
environmental issues.11
Social activism, along with socially responsible investing
(“SRI”), has a long history among individuals and private
institutional investors. Since at least the nineteenth century,
certain shareholders aligned their investments with their religious
views and refrained from buying shares in “sinful” entities that
produced or sold alcohol, tobacco, or gambling-related services.12
However, SRI-focused investments by sovereigns, the subject of
the next Section, is a relatively recent phenomenon.
2.

SOVEREIGNS, SRI, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

This Section posits that there are three paradigms under which
sovereigns—national and subnational political units—engage in
SRI through portfolio investing: (1) Ethics-based Legislative
Exclusion, (2) Nation-centric Legislative Exclusion, and (3) Extralegislative Activism.

7
Lori Verstegen Ryan & Marguerite Schneider, The Antecedents of
Institutional Investor Activism, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 554, 555 (2002).
8 Id.
9
Janet H. Marler & Christophe Faugère, Shareholder Activism and Middle
Management Equity Incentives, 18 CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 313, 314–16 (2010).
10 Id. at 314–16.
11 William Q. Judge et al., Antecedents of Shareholder Activism in Target Firms:
Evidence from a Multi-Country Study, 18 CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 258, 259 (2010).
12 See generally Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets:
The Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. LAW. 681,
682–85 (2002).
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2.1. Ethics-Based Legislative Exclusion: Norway’s Sovereign Fund
The ethics-based exclusion model largely relies on exit activism
in that a government-sponsored fund, through a process mandated
by law, divests from certain companies and excludes them from its
investment universe based on unethical or illegal corporate
conduct.
This model is best demonstrated by Norway’s Government
Pension Fund-Global (“GPFG”), a sovereign wealth fund (“SWF”),
whose activities have been analyzed extensively by legal scholars.13
SWFs—including GPFG—are distinguished from the pension
funds discussed later in this Article in that SWFs are, by definition,
government-owned investment vehicles without explicit fixed
payment liabilities to pensioners.14 However, some SWFs (GPFG
included) are created to share wealth across generations or to
function as contingency investment vehicles charged with
addressing a polity’s potential pension shortcomings in the future.
(Other types of SWFs are used to protect government budgets from
volatility in commodity prices, to obtain higher investment returns
than traditional reserve holdings, or to fund infrastructure and
socioeconomic projects.)
Historically, SWFs have been passive investors, but they
possess a natural tendency for shareholder activism.15 They are
increasingly involved in the capital markets and invest in both
traditional and nontraditional asset classes, utilizing a mixture of
investment strategies.16
GPFG is the prime example of an SWF that has publicly
engaged in both voice and exit social activism. The fund operates
based on a series of legislature-imposed ethical norms and is
13
See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory
Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance
Through Private Global Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 425 (2010) (examining the
Norwegian SWF in action and analyzing its investment effects).
14
INT’L WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES – “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 3
(2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
15
See generally Salar Ghahramani, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Shareholder
Activism: Applying the Ryan-Schneider Antecedents to Determine Policy Implications,
13 CORP. GOV. 58 (2013).
16
See Salar Ghahramani, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Transnational Law, and the
New Paradigms of International Financial Relations, 8 YALE J. INT’L AFF., no. 2, 2013 at
52, 52 (detailing some of the asset types in which SWFs invest).
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monitored by the Council on Ethics, established by Royal Decree
and charged with evaluating whether the fund’s investments are
consistent with the specific guidelines.17 The Council serves in an
advisory role to the Ministry of Finance, which controls the fund.
The legislative Ethics Guidelines require that GPFG’s
investment universe exclude companies that:


produce weapons that
humanitarian norms;



make tobacco; or



sell military material to those states whose
government bonds GPFG is not permitted to
purchase.18 (Burma fell under this category until
January 2014—at which point it was removed and
replaced by North Korea, Syria, and Iran—and a
Chinese seller of military trucks to the country was
excluded from the fund’s investments for this
reason.)19

violate

fundamental

Additionally, on the advice of the Council on Ethics, the
Ministry may exclude companies that may be responsible for:


systematic human rights violations;



violations of the rights of individuals in war or
conflict;



severe environmental damage;



gross corruption; or

17
Council
on
Ethics,
GOVERNMENT.NO,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-radutvalg/ethics_council.html?id=434879 (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
18 Guidelines for the Observation and Exclusion of Companies from the Government
Pension
Fund
Global’s
Investment
Universe,
GOVERNMENT.NO,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-rad-utvalg/ethics_council/ethicalguidelines.html?id=425277 [hereinafter Ethical Guidelines].
19 Press Release, Norwegian Ministry of Fin., Supplier of Military Materials
to Burma Excluded from Government Pension Fund—Global (Mar. 13, 2009),
available
at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2ndGovernment/Ministry-of-Finance/Nyheter-ogpressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2009/supplier-of-military-materials-toburma-.html?id=549152.
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other violations of fundamental ethical norms.20

Currently, sixty companies are on GPFG’s exclusion list,
including Singapore Technologies for its production of antipersonnel land mines; Raytheon for making cluster munitions;
Boeing, Honeywell, and Lockheed Martin for nuclear arms
production; Altria and Philip Morris for tobacco; Wal-Mart for
human rights violations; Rio Tinto and Freeport McMoRan for
severe environmental damage; Potash for serious violations of
fundamental ethical norms; and Shikun & Binui for violating rights
of individuals in war or conflict.21
If the Ministry of Finance has doubts as to whether a
company’s conduct renders it ineligible to remain in the fund’s
investment universe, it may choose to place the company in
question under observation. As of the writing of this Article,
Alstom, a French conglomerate specializing in energy and
transport infrastructure, is on a four-year watch list of the Council
on Ethics as per the Ministry of Finance’s concerns regarding
Alstom’s “unacceptable risk of gross corruption in the company’s
operations.”22 (Initially, in 2010, the Council on Ethics had advised
the Ministry of Finance that GPFG should divest its holdings from
Alstom due to the widespread bribery allegations leveled against
the company in several countries,23 but the Ministry ultimately
elected to place Alstom on the watch list due to the uncertain
outcome of the ongoing legal proceedings against the company.)24
Essentially, the ethics-based legislative model, unlike the
paradigm discussed next, is not state-centric in that the decision to
exclude is largely based on a company’s conduct or a product that
Ethical Guidelines, supra note 18.
Companies Excluded from the Investment Universe, GOVERNMENT.NO,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-governmentpension-fund/responsible-investments/companies-excluded-from-theinvestment-u.html?id=447122 (last updated Jan. 30, 2014).
22
Government Pension Fund Global: Company Placed on Observation List,
GOVERNMENT.NO, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2ndGovernment/Ministry-of-Finance/Nyheter-ogpressemeldinger/nyheter/2011/government-pension-fund-global-companyp.html?id=665635 (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Observation List].
23
COUNCIL ON ETHICS, TO THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE: RECOMMENDATION OF 1
DECEMBER
2010
,
available
at
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2588965/alstom_e_2010.pdf.
24 Observation List, supra note 22.
20
21
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it produces rather than where it operates or with which country it
does business.
2.2. Nation-Centric Legislative Exclusion: The American State
Under the nation-centric model, the legislature mandates that
the public pension funds under its jurisdiction refrain from
investing in companies that do business with specific countries.
The model may be observed in numerous sub-federal units in
the United States that have, in effect, engaged in transnational lawmaking and SRI through their state or local public pension
systems. This form of exclusion can be traced back to the 1980s
divestment regulations of the Apartheid era, when numerous local
and state governments prohibited their public pension funds from
investing in companies that had South African operations or had
not agreed to the original Sullivan principles of non-segregation
and equal and fair employment and pay.25
The American state continues to spearhead this model. For
instance, a number of states have enacted laws prohibiting their
public funds from investing in companies that do business with
Sudan due the country’s human rights violations and the genocide
in Darfur. At times, the Sudan-related legislative declarations
accompanying the statutory texts allude to international law. For
example, the California statute that forbids the state’s public
employee retirement funds from investing in companies that have
business operations in Sudan partially relies on the United Nations
Convention of 1948 and the findings by the United Nations
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to justify the state’s
divestment requirements.26
The same statute requires that the state’s public funds become
activist shareholders, compelling the funds to send written notices
to the affected companies, requesting that the companies take
substantial action within 90 days to reduce their Sudan exposure,
and, if substantial progress is not shown by the companies, to
utilize exit activism and fully divest from the entities.27
Additionally, a number of states have adopted specific policies

25 See generally Kevin P. Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality
of State and Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 469 (1987).
26 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7513.6 (Deering 2013).
27 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7513.6(g) (Deering 2013).
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on Cuba, Iran, and Syria and require their public pension funds to
exercise exit activism and divest their holdings in companies that
do business with one or more of these nations.28 As an example,
Florida requires its State Board of Administration to divest from
Cuba and is “prohibited from investment in stocks, securities, or
other obligations of . . . [a]ny institution or company domiciled in
the United States, or foreign subsidiary of a company domiciled in
the United States, doing business in or with Cuba, or with agencies
or instrumentalities thereof . . . .”29
2.3. Extra-Legislative Activism: CalPERS
Under this model, government funds pursue SRI objectives
beyond, or in the absence of, legislative mandates.
The model is utilized by the California Public Employees’
Retirement System (“CalPERS”), a state agency with an investment
portfolio value of over $270 billion,30 the largest state pension fund
in the United States and perhaps the most forceful in its utilization
of shareholder activism.
CalPERS goes beyond what the state requires of it31 and
actively considers environmental, social, and governance factors in
what it calls the ESG approach. Throughout the past decade, the
fund has joined the Investor Network on Climate Risk, adopted a
plan to reduce energy consumption in its real estate portfolio by
twenty percent over a five-year period, and signed on to the
United Nations-sponsored Principles for Responsible Investment
(“PRI”).32
The fund has also adopted the Global Sullivan Principles of
Corporate Social Responsibility, the objectives of which are to
28
See generally Salar Ghahramani, Divestment Laws, Fiduciary Duty, and
Pension Fund Management: An Empirical Examination, 56 INT’L J.L. & MGMT. 29
(2014).
29 FLA. STAT. § 215.471 (2013).
30
CAL. PUB. EMP. RET. SYS., FACTS AT A GLANCE (Feb. 2014), available at
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/facts-at-a-glance.pdf.
31
Currently, California law requires the state’s pension funds to observe,
engage, or divest from companies with operations in Iran, Northern Ireland, and
Sudan, as well as businesses with Holocaust-related legacy. CAL. PUB. EMP. RET.
SYS., TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT: TAKING RESPONSIBILITY 28 (2012), available
at
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/invest-corp/esgreport-2012.pdf [hereinafter TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT].
32 Id. at 7.
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support economic, social, and political justice, and has urged
corporations to adhere to the human rights, labor, environmental,
and anti-corruption principles of the United Nations Global
Compact, a soft law regime based on a number of international
instruments.33
Based on its ESG approach, the fund has used its proxy-voting
rights to endorse social and environmental shareholder proposals34
and has invested in biofuels, solar, wind and other alternative
energy companies.35 In 2010, the fund allocated $500 million to an
environmental index fund that invests in approximately 380 global
stocks that derive a significant portion of their revenues from
environmentally-sound sectors.36 CalPERS has also dedicated one
percent of its total investments, which currently measure about
$2.3 billion, to investments in forestlands in order to address
climate change.37
In the past, CalPERS has taken into account the civil liberties
and human rights records of various states in order to exclude
entire countries from its investments. In 2002, for instance, the
fund announced that it would sell its holdings in the Philippines,
Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia because the countries did not
meet its human rights standards,38 and, until 2007, had a
“Permissible Country List” that essentially prohibited equity
investments in certain countries.39 But, upon concluding that the
approach adversely affected the fund’s returns, CalPERS
established the Emerging Equity Market Principles (“EEMP”),
which set the basis for the fund’s policies on social issues,40 and

33
CAL. PUB. EMP. RET. SYS., GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
17–18
(2011),
http://www.calpersgovernance.org/principles/home.
34 TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT, supra note 31, at 12.
35 Id. at 21.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 22.
38
CalPERS’ New World View Hits Home in Asia, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2002,
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/feb/21/business/fi-wrap21.
39 TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT, supra note 31, at 29.
40
See generally CAL. PUB. EMP. RET. SYS., STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT POLICIES
FOR EMERGING EQUITY MARKET PRINCIPLES (2013), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eipdocs/investments/policies/inv-asset-classes/equity/ext-equity/emerging-eqtymarket-prinicples.pdf [hereinafter EEMP].
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now excludes individual companies rather than countries.41
EEMP considers the following factors:
 Political stability, which the fund defines as “[p]rogress
toward the development of basic democratic institutions and
principles”42 and consists of factors such as respect for civil
liberties and human rights, the presence of a strong and
independent judiciary and democratic accountability, and the
absence of ethnic tensions, corruption, and religion and military in
politics;43
 Transparency in politics, economic policy, and the financial
markets as advanced by freedom of the press and lack of
censorship and physical violations against the media;44
 Productive labor practices that include absence of harmful
labor practices or use of child labor and compliance with the
International Labor Organization Declaration on the Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work;45
 Corporate social responsibility and sustainability, which include
factors such as environmental protection and compliance with the
Global Sullivan Principles;46
 Market regulation and liquidity;47
 Capital market openness, as embedded in free market policies
and legal protection for foreign investors;48
 Proficiency and efficiency in the financial markets;49 and
 Proper disclosure on environmental, social, and corporate
governance issues.50
To achieve its EEMP objectives, CalPERS has contracted an
external advisory firm that analyzes the fund’s investments in
emerging economies and undertakes a three-step process that
helps CalPERS make investment decisions. The steps include: (1)
the analysis of all emerging market investments with a particular
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT, supra note 31, at 29.
EEMP, supra note 40, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
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focus on the companies’ compliance with international labor
standards and CSR principles; (2) rating of companies as “pass,”
“watch list,” or “red flag;” and (3) excluding “red flag” companies
from the fund’s investment universe.51 CalPERS claims that the
EEMP and the above-noted processes have helped the fund
positively impact CSR issues in the emerging markets.52
3.

CONCLUSION

State-sponsored portfolio investors are often missing from the
FDI-centered discussions on CSR in international investments.
This Article has attempted to examine the methods by which the
state’s instrumentalities pursue international norms and CSR
objectives as activist shareholders and how such examination may
supplement our understanding of the various tools available in
addressing state or corporate participation or complicity in
breaches of international law and human rights principles and
threats to sustainability and the environment. What this Article
has purposely avoided is judging the merits of utilizing the
financial markets as a governmental tool for advancing certain
norms, an endeavor beyond the scope of this project but worth
consideration.

51
52

TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT, supra note 31, at 29.
Id.
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